A few words about the “limits” of ontology deconstruction

The key phase of deconstruction is “reversal”, i.e., the denial of any ontological postulates and terms. The stake of deconstruction is to write out the possibility and inevitability of such a practice of reading texts that would be free from ontology. At the same time, deconstruction works on the “fields” of ontology, but this cannot be called the preservation of ontology, since it is reversal (denial) that remains the monotonously occurring phase of deconstruction. In addition, in “Derrida’s texts” there are many statements that deconstruction moves beyond the “limits of ontology”. The object of the study is this decisive phase of deconstruction - reversal. The article offers a view of deconstruction as a practice that has “limits” to such a denial. Limits are understood as non-deconstructible gestures of deconstruction that “liken” deconstruction to ontology. Deconstruction has an irreducible phase, “reversal”, which consists in the negation of binary opposition. Reversal is “introduced” by deconstruction as a “necessary”, i.e., non-eliminable, gesture. At the same time, the necessity of reversal cannot be “derived” from the reversal of a certain set of cases; therefore, this phase becomes similar to a number of ontological propositions, the certainty of which tradition could not “demonstrate” in principle and took them on faith. The “monotony” and “systematicity” of reversal can also be likened to the “sequence” that is usually required of ontological theories. Deconstruction conceptualizes ontology as something unified, i.e., in the manner of ontology itself. The science of archi-writing (the figure of achievement and writing of which is deconstruction) strives to be a “science of sciences”, which relates this science to ontology. In addition, deconstruction is marked in the language of ontology as “original”, “primary”, “initial”, etc. Deconstruction is forced to deny something, not nothing; therefore, its limit, among other things, is the very concepts and provisions of ontology, thanks to which deconstruction functions. All this is the limit of ontology. Also, deconstruction, in addition to denial, has a conceptualization phase, but ontology could not do without the desire to produce meaning. Finally, deconstruction is apparently limited only by texts and this is its limit, but if not (and deconstruction extends to extra-textual reality), then we will have to face a number of pragmatic difficulties in everyday life, which are the result of deconstructing the legal system. Despite the statement of deconstruction about leaving the boundaries of ontology, it continues to “depend” on ontology and have some limits of its own strategy. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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