Truthmaker theory by David Armstrong

Armstrong's theory of truth represents a development of the correspondence theory and focuses on the concept of truthmakers. To understand Armstrong's answer to the question “What is truth?”, it is necessary to consider three key questions: What are truth-bearers? What are truthmakers? What is the relationship between them? Truth-bearers, according to Armstrong, are propositions. They are not speech acts but intentional objects of beliefs and thoughts - abstractions from their content. Propositions are considered universals and can be actual or possible, including those we may never know. This allows for truths that potentially exist independently of our knowledge of them. Truthmakers are states of affairs or particulars. For example, for the truth “2 is less than 3”, the truthmakers are the numbers 2 and 3 themselves. Armstrong introduces the concept of minimal truthmakers - those sufficient for the truth of a proposition without redundancy. This helps avoid ontological “overload” by not introducing unnecessary entities. The relationship between truth-bearers and truthmakers is characterized as necessary and cross-categorial. The existence of a truthmaker necessarily makes the corresponding proposition true. Although this relationship links objects from different categories, Armstrong asserts that it is internal and does not require additional entities. He also employs the principle of entailment: if a truthmaker T makes a proposition p true, and p entails q, then T is also a truthmaker for q. Armstrong adheres to maximalism, asserting that for every true proposition there exists a truthmaker. In complex cases, such as negative and modal truths, he introduces the concept of totality facts. For negative truths, totality facts together with positive facts provide the truthmaker, avoiding the need to introduce an infinite number of negative facts. Despite its systematic nature, the theory faces difficulties. Acknowledging negative facts and the complexity of the necessitation relation between truth-bearers and truthmakers increase ontological commitments. However, Armstrong's work stimulates further research in the philosophy of truth, encouraging discussion and the search for solutions to the identified problems, and deepens the understanding of the nature of truth in the metaphysical picture of the world. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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