Manipulative сapacity of artificial intelligence

This article examines the manipulative capacity of artificial intelligence (AI) in comparison with natural intelligence (NI). To this end, the study analyzes the development of the psyche in phylogenesis and its highest form-human consciousness. The specific features of human thinking are delineated in contrast to animal cognition, with the primary distinguishing characteristic identified as the human ability to operate at an abstract level. A comparative analysis of artificial and natural thinking is conducted, leading to the conclusion that the difference in their cognitive processes is more quantitative than qualitative. A further distinction lies in the substrate of thought: NI is realized through electrical impulses within a neuro-humoral environment, whereas AI functions within a silicon-based environment. However, the fundamental difference between NI and AI lies in the nature of their motivation. AI’s motivation is assigned by its creator-programmer, while the source of motivation for NI is the self-preservation instinct. For NI, this instinct serves as both an impulse for development and activity, and a regulator that imposes limits. In contrast, AI lacks a self-preservation instinct and is thus devoid of both an inherent drive to act and any intrinsic constraints. This absence of self-preservation in AI infinitely expands its manipulative capacity, both as an object and as an instrument of manipulation. Figuratively, AI operates on the principle of “I see the goal, I see no obstacles”. For NI, the self-preservation instinct acts as a determinant of control and self-restraint, forcing a correlation between the value of a goal and the potential losses incurred in its pursuit. Since self-preservation is not a “built-in option” for AI, it can pursue a goal without accounting for losses, even to the point of self-destruction. The novelty of this research lies in its differentiation of the determinants of NI and AI specifically within the context of manipulative capacity. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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