The experience of using remote electronic voting technology in Switzerland, the USA, and Russia | Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2025. № 87. DOI: 10.17223/1998863X/87/18

The experience of using remote electronic voting technology in Switzerland, the USA, and Russia

This study analyzes international and domestic experiences with remote electronic voting (REV) and assesses its impact on electoral processes. The relevance of this research stems from the first large-scale implementation of REV in Russia during the 2024 presidential election and the ongoing global integration of this technology. The study aims to conduct a comparative analysis of REV models in Switzerland, the United States, and Russia, determine the technology's influence on voter turnout, and identify systemic challenges associated with its application. Switzerland, with its long history of REV experimentation since 2000, shifted towards a model prioritizing maximum transparency and cryptographic security following controversies in 2019. The Swiss system is characterized by complex, multi-stage verification, open-source code, and rigorous stress testing. Despite its high security, it has been criticized for complexity, which may hinder voter accessibility, and for potential compromises to ballot secrecy. Nevertheless, its use contributed to a 1.5% increase in turnout in the 2023 federal elections, primarily among citizens living abroad and voters with disabilities. The United States exemplifies a cautious and decentralized approach, where REV is fully available only in a few states. American experts highlight key risks, including a lack of proven, reliable technology, the inability to conduct manual recounts, vulnerabilities in voter identification, and the presence of a more established alternative in postal voting. The Russian REV model, first deployed at the federal level in 2024, is built on blockchain technology and integrated with the Gosuslugi portal. As evidenced by the case of Tomsk Oblast, the technology did not significantly impact overall turnout. Its primary challenges include a lack of transparency in auditing procedures, potential security vulnerabilities, and a deficit of trust from the IT community. In conclusion, REV remains an evolving technology that presents a dual potential: to enhance electoral accessibility while simultaneously posing significant risks to the security and legitimacy of the electoral process. Its successful future implementation depends not only on resolving technical issues but also on developing rigorous standards, ensuring transparency, and fostering public trust. The widespread adoption of REV necessitates a thorough examination of the legal framework and a comprehensive strategy that incorporates international experience and addresses critical challenges. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

Keywords

elections, platforms, remote electronic voting

Authors

NameOrganizationE-mail
Dulsky Andrey D.National Research Tomsk State UniversityDulya_ad@mail.ru
Всего: 1

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 The experience of using remote electronic voting technology in Switzerland, the USA, and Russia | Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2025. № 87. DOI: 10.17223/1998863X/87/18

The experience of using remote electronic voting technology in Switzerland, the USA, and Russia | Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science. 2025. № 87. DOI: 10.17223/1998863X/87/18

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