Classification and classifiers in the institutional structures of science

This article presents a comprehensive study of the role classifications and classifiers play in organizing scientific knowledge and shaping the institutional structures of science. The authors examine scientific classifiers not merely as tools for systematizing knowledge but as vital elements in the social organization of science itself. Particular attention is paid to the conceptual distinction between “classification” as a process and “classifier” as a tool, a distinction that requires clarification in light of the social nature of scientific cognition. A central focus is the analysis of institutional mechanisms in science. Drawing on a work of Mary Douglas, the authors demonstrate how scientific institutions utilize principles of analogy and classification practices to organize cognitive activity, reduce cognitive load, and legitimize their existence through processes of naturalization. The dual nature of analogy is emphasized - serving as a tool for institutional stability while also posing a potential source of cognitive errors in research practice. The study also contrasts scientific and folk classifications, identifying their fundamental differences: scientific classifications aim to uncover deep systemic connections and identities, whereas folk classifications are rooted in tradition and practical utility. This conflict is examined as a manifestation of the broader tension between professional and everyday knowledge in scientific activity. The analysis further explores the formation of scientific disciplines as a social phenomenon. The authors argue that disciplinary boundaries are determined not only by the objective structure of the studied reality but also by the paradigmatic frameworks of the scientific community. Critiquing the traditional functional approach to classifying sciences, the article justifies an alternative, substrate-based principle that reflects contemporary trends toward knowledge integration. In its concluding sections, the article addresses the problem of classifying scientists themselves. The authors observe that while modern science maintains disciplinary divisions, it simultaneously exhibits a strong tendency toward interdisciplinarity. The unity of the scientific community is sustained not by formal classifications alone but by shared values and communicative practices that enable transcending narrow disciplinary boundaries. The study concludes that classification systems in science possess a dual nature. They reflect the objective structure of scientific knowledge while simultaneously being products of social relations within the scientific community. This duality manifests in the persistent tension between processes of knowledge differentiation and integration, between professional and folk classification schemes, and between disciplinary specialization and interdisciplinary synthesis. The authors declare no conflicts of interests.

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