Realism in constructivist epistemologies

Scientific theories are utilized by researchers within certain constraints pertaining to their consequences, not arbitrarily, as noted by Steve Fuller. Realists, of course, maintain that these constraints are imposed by the external world. They argue that theories “preserve phenomena” not through serendipity, linguistic convenience, methodological choices, or social agreements, but due to ontological necessity. From this perspective, an invariant core of knowledge is transmitted across theoretical shifts throughout history, ensuring that much is not lost to cultural memory. Natural kinds are often cited as exemplars of such necessary knowledge. While disciplines indeed acknowledge the ontological differences and boundaries of such kinds, their formation and evolution are also shaped by intellectual traditions, practical expediency, and more contingent factors such as academic fashion, political influence, commercial benefit, prospects for discovery, and available expertise. The article posits that natural kinds entail a realist commitment, pointing to objective differences in the nature of things that are accessible to reason. In contrast, kinds constructed purely by reason lack this ontological necessity. Philosophers further differentiate other categories of real objects whose existence and internal properties are independent of the mind, even if they are not “natural” in the strict sense. Consequently, classifications cannot disregard the ontology of their objects, even when analyzing the diverse social and epistemic factors that influence cognition. If science is indeed engaged with an extra-social reality, this should be understood as the action of causes of a diverse nature upon our beliefs (Barry Barnes, David Bloor), rather than a reduction of knowledge to mere social opinions, conventions, or institutional truths (which Barnes and Bloor analyze as “knowledge in the sociological sense”). Ultimately, the boundaries of disciplines are negotiated entities that simultaneously accommodate ontology, intellectual traditions, and local practical contexts. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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