The theory of language ascriptivity and the construction of modal objects

Our ontology includes not only ordinary objects that do not require ultimate conceptualization and form the basis of our experience. Such ordinary objects are accessible to reference or, to put it more simply, accessible to ostensive definition. Our ontology includes objects whose existence is not reducible to physical representation in the world. Some of these are given to us descriptively. For example, the language of mathematics describes immaterial, abstract objects. But there are also others that, while serving as the meaning of a linguistic expression, are not ontologically necessary. Such modal objects, for example, in the context of jurisprudence, include rights and obligations. According to H. Hart, it is impossible to provide descriptive statements regarding such unusual objects, since they are not simply terms, but direct elements of discursive practices. In some cases, the implementation of an ascriptive act necessitates the introduction of a new modal object into ontology. Consequently, the ascriptive nature of everyday language should be considered as one aspect of ontology construction. Accordingly, the use of ascriptive expressions should not be viewed as a referential or descriptive reference to an ordinary object. The semantics of language are determined not only by the immediate adequacy of word use, intentions, or presuppositions of the speech agent. Thus, J. Perry identifies context as an element determining the semantics of linguistic expressions. It is precisely the contextual mediation of acts of using ascriptive expressions that allows us to distinguish the content of two tautological expressions: (1) “Bill committed a crime” when Bill finished the last piece of cake, and (2) “Bill committed a crime” when Bill forcibly took a woman's purse and ran away with it. Without strictly defined extralinguistic conditions that constitute the discursive context, Bill's actions cannot legitimately be described as “Bill committed a crime.” The fact is that in reality, there exists a legal system, which serves as the very context within which an ascriptive act is possible, through which the action committed by Bill will be qualified as a crime. That is, some action committed by Bill, within the framework of our terminology, should be considered ontologically necessary. Whereas qualifying a specific event or action committed by Bill as a crime is not ontologically necessary. It is precisely the “crime that Bill committed,” which may subsequently become an object of reference, which arises as a result of the ascriptive act and is qualified by us as a modal object. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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