LATER L. WITTGENSTEIN'S ANTI-REALISM
L. Wittgenstein's semanticconception 'meaning as use' is considered in the article. Author tries to enter L. Wittgenstein's ideasin the general classification of semantic projects of analytic philosophy in accordance with distinctionrealism/anti-realism. Explication of Wittgenstein's conception is presented by means of research ofthe different forms of conventionalism as one of typical manifestation of anti-realism.
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Keywords
реализм, антиреализм, конвенционализм, значение, Витгенштейн, аналитическая философия, realism, anti-realism, conventionalism, meaning, Wittgenstein, analytic philosophyAuthors
| Name | Organization | |
| Ladov V.A. |
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