DEBATE ON FUNCTIONALISM: PROBLEM OF INVERTED SPECTRUM.
This article searches the main problem for the functionalist philosophy of mind. This is socalled problem of «inverted spectrum» which shows the functionalist's inability in explaining thephenomenal content of the mental state. The possible way out consists in taking the naturalist approachin epistemology which states the suspicion on the existence of phenomenal experience.
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Keywords
функционализм, инверсия спектра, феноменальное содержание, ментальные состояния, натурализм, Functionalism, inversion spectrum, phenomenal content, mental states, naturalismAuthors
| Name | Organization | |
| Tarasov I.P. |
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