Knowledge, getteier problems and some discussions in contemporary russianEpistemology

The article presents an overview of some recentdiscussions in Russian epistemology devoted to the nature and the definition of propositional knowledge.The starting point of the work are the problems raised by Edmund Gettier in his article Is JustifiedTrue Belief Knowledge? and the proposed solutions for these problems by some contemporaryRussian philosophers.Three main approaches here are distinguished: a standard approach, a philosophyof science approach, and non-classical externalist approach.The standard approach is represented bytheorists who are critical about Gettiers arguments as well as the arguments of his proponents. As anexample of such theories the author analyzes the approach of Grigory Olkhovikov according to whichthe critics of the standard definition of propositional knowledge fail to offer a strict and correct argumentin support of their views. In order to strengthen the standard definition he introduces a restrictionaccording to which an argument for standard definition is to be based only on true premises. Someother of Olkhovikovs qualifications are discussed as well as his debate with Lev Lamberov. The authorof the article sides with Olkhovikov approach claiming that all counterarguments in the spirit ofGettier against the standard approach in one way or the other end up being based on a false premise ora presupposition. In this section some other externalist arguments against the standard conception ofpropositional knowledge (e.g. the argument formulated by A.Goldman) are analyzed in the light oftheir discussion by such Russian philosophers as E.Vostrikova and A.Antonovski. The second approachto a definition of propositional knowledge (dubbed as that of philosophy of science) is discussedon the material of texts by A.Nikiforov and I.Kasavin. The author criticizes this approach for itsmethodological problems among which its use of a notion of false knowledge. Finally, the nonclassicalapproach is discussed on the examples by social epistemological conception of I.Kasavin andA.Cherniak. Both are criticized for an unjustified broadening of the notion of knowledge. The authordraws some conclusions about further possible problems within this area of contemporary Russianepistemology.

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