Intentionality in Herbert Harts legal philosophy

Inarticle research of meaning of concepts "intention", "decision", "action", their interrelation and relevanceto Herbert Hart's legal philosophy is presented. Through the analysis of imperativeness of legalrules it is established them intentionality. In each of the following pairs of sentences certainty is mentioned:(1) "I am not sure which of these I like best". "I know which I like". (2) "He does not knowwhat he wants". "I now know what I want" (3) "I think I will do it, but I am not sure". "I know nowwhat I will do" (where an entirely voluntary action is envisaged). The kind of knowledge referred to ineach of these sentences, as they are normally used, would be dissociated from any possible appeal toevidence. This is the most important, but not the only, respect in which there is an analogy between thepairs of sentences (1), (2) and (3). There is also an analogy in the grammatical form of these sentences.In the article "Decision, Intention, and Certainty" S. Hampshire and H.L.A. Hart are argued that thereis only one case of the kind of certainty that cannot be associated with any appeal to evidence: namely,case (3), a man's knowledge of his own present and future voluntary actions. Author's thesis is thatthere is a necessary connection between certainty of this kind, and upon this topic, and deciding to dosomething, and also that there is a necessary connection between certainty of this kind and intending todo something, and doing it intentionally.

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