Some reasons about justification of formal realism

The paper considers argumentation for justification of the preference for the realist positionin philosophy in comparison with the anti-realist conceptions. This version of realism is named bythe author as a formal realism. As other versions of realism it recognizes the existence of objectivereality and the possibility of its comprehension by means of the procedure of correspondence. In otherwords, the statement is true if it corresponds to the real state of affairs. The specificity of this conceptlies in the proposed distribution of priorities. The nature of the objective world has secondary characterin relation to the justification of the existence of an objective reality. The main argument is that anystatement denying any form of realism is self-inconsistent or self-denying. Moreover, according to theauthor, the way of the making the anti-realistic statements is based, as a matter of fact, on the principlesof realism. Therefore, the author insists that realism is the only point of view, avoiding contradictionslike that. We suppose that the basic argument of formal realism contradicts to its own principles.Preference of realism should be proved not by its possibility to avoid contradictions but its ability toshow the existence of an objective reality. The argument from consistency is more suitable for thejustification of anti-realism principles. We believe that anti-realist should avoid the pitfalls of a discourseof realism when they proclaim their principles. They should not make the propositions whichimply establishment of correspondences.

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