On the value of the rule-following problem

The paper is devoted to the rule-following problem and skeptic argument, which were stated by S. A. Kripke. The discussion of rule-following, concentrated in Philosophical Investigations §§185-242 and in part VI of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, is absolutely central to Wittgenstein's «later» philosophies of language, mathematics and mind. So, rule-following problem and skeptic argument are considering in context of «later» Wittgenstein. According to Kripke, the paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule - the applications of which are potentially infinite - when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule-following at all? Crucial point against Kripke's reading is that an initial material for the discussion of rule-following, concentrated in Philosophical Investigations §§185-242 does not links with the distinction between finite instances and potentially infinite rule, but - a distinction between rule and rule-following. Rule-following does not need any ground of formalized or generally formulated rule, it take place of itself. Rule-following problem is a pseudo-problem. According to this straight attempt to solve the problem was critically revised.

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