Development of conventional deterrence theory in modern political science
The issue of deterrence in regional conflicts during the last decades arouses growing interest among researchers, while requiring deep theoretical analysis and systematization. Herewith if during the years of the Cold War deterrence largely meant deterrence with nuclear weapons, the last decades increased the value of conventional military deterrence (i.e., deterrence through conventional weapons). The article is devoted to the dynamics of development of the theory of conventional deterrence, both in English-language and Soviet / Russian political science. The main stages of the "general" theory of deterrence have also been considered, as particularly within its frames and using its terminological basis the theory of conventional deterrence has been developed. Assessment of main publications of such classics of deterrence theory as Bernard Brodie, Glen Snyder, Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, Alexander George, Patric Morgan and Lawrence Freedman has been done in the current paper. It is noted that they have made a significant contribution to the theory of deterrence, development of its core framework, structure and classification. It is also noted that deterrence, which according to the prominent American scholar Robert Jervis was "probably the most influential school of thought in the American study of international relations", many theorists consider along with theory of compellence in the framework of a broader "coercion theory" developed by Thomas Schelling. In the chapter, immediately devoted to conventional deterrence, it has been noted that in contrast to nuclear deterrence (which appeared during the Cold War period) the origins of deterrence through conventional weapons have been maintained since ancient times. It is noted that the interest to the conventional deterrence in the Western / English language political science has increased since the mid-1970s, and continues its sustainable growth today. Such scholars as John Mearsheimer, Samuel Hantington, George Quester, Richard Rosecrance, Colin Gray, Richard Betts and others, have made their important contribution to the theory of conventional deterrence. The paper also provides a general overview of the development of Soviet / Russian school of deterrence, associated with names of such classics as Andrey Kokoshin, Sergey Karaganov, Georgiy and Alexey Ar-batov, Sergey Oznobishiev, Sergey Rogov, etc. Among the new generation of post-Soviet researchers we should also mention A. Fenen-ko, O. Ivanov, Yu. Pechatnov, P. Sinovets, and others. The article analyzes the most important, from our point of view, publications, which made a significant or even a fundamental contribution to the development and current level of the theory and practice of deterrence.
Keywords
теория сдерживания,
конвенциональное сдерживание,
исследования в сфере безопасности,
теория международных отношений,
военно-политические аспекты региональной безопасности,
deterrence theory,
conventional deterrence,
security studies,
international relations theory,
military-political aspects of regional securityAuthors
| Minasyan Sergey M. | Caucasus Institute (Yerevan, Armenia) | sergey@c-i.am |
Всего: 1
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