On the authenticity of the “Self” in the structure of a narrative identity

“Who are we?” is not a question with an obvious and unambiguous answer for us. Over the course of our lives, we discover that we were mistaken about who we thought we were in the past: in retrospect, we discover events in our biography that shape who we are now, as well as those aspects that reveal versions of ourselves about which we did not know before. We understand that we are often mistaken about who other people are, that we and others lie about ourselves, sometimes without even knowing it. However, when we review our past and make plans for the future in the present, we discover in them a subjectively experienced sense of self-identity. Paul Ricoeur’s theory of narrative identity offers an explanation of how the self is formed and constituted and how our identities emerge. This article analyzes the concept of narrative identity, and also provides a response to the frequently encountered objections raised against this theory, which claims that the narrative identity reveals a divided “self’: the initial “empirical self’ and the later emerging narrative about the “self’ (the “narrative self’). This objection is based on an empiricist-positivist attitude that asserts that what is given directly in sensory perception is most real, while narrative is understood as a “cognitive tool” through which a meaningful order is retrospectively constructed, falsifying the true nature of the subject’s experience of existence. That is, in order for the self to be told, it must already exist. From a critical perspective, this doubling of the self asserts a false understanding of the self in a narrative identity, as we create a division between who we are and who we say we are. The research presented here offers a conceptual answer to this objection, eliminating the apparent division between different levels of the self. Responses to criticism are formed in two directions. Firstly, with the help of Jan Patocka’s concept of ontological dynamics of “movement”, it is possible to demonstrate how the “self’ can simultaneously be both an actor and a narrator, constituting a personality. Secondly, the issue of the truth and falsity of narratives that constitute a narrative identity is considered in the context of Judith Butler’s ethics of vulnerability and Christine Corrsgard’s ethical subjectivism. The author declares no conflicts of interests.

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